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A little over a year ago, close to 200,000 people took to the streets to protest the
European copyright reform. At the core of the controversy about Directive 2019/790
on Copyright in the Digital Single Market  (DSM Directive) lies Article 17, which makes
certain online platforms directly liable for copyright infringements of their users. In
order to avoid liability, platforms will have to block access to works upon request of
rightsholders, raising concern that legal uses of protected content will be blocked in the
process. Protests have died down after the adoption of the directive, as Member States
are engaged in the difficult task of transposing Article 17 into national law. It would be a
mistake, however, to take this relative calm for an indication that the conflict has been
resolved. While the implementation deadline for the Member States is coming closer,
the conflicts have been taken to court.
Article 17 before the Court
A public hearing before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) last Tuesday, November
10, dealt with the compatibility of Article 17, more precisely the provisions of
Article 17 that require platforms to block copyright infringements, with the Charter
of Fundamental Rights (Case C-401/19). The Court heard the complaint by the
Republic of Poland against the European Parliament and the Council (representing the
European Union’s legislative branch), which seeks the annulment of Article 17 or parts
thereof on the grounds that it violates the fundamental right to freedom of expression
and information by requiring platforms to install upload filters. Reflecting on the results
of the hearing, the German Society for Civil Rights (Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte
e.V.) is publishing a study today, of which I am a co-author, which demonstrates the
incompatibility of Article 17 with the Charter in several respects.
It may seem ironic to the casual observer that this fundamental rights case is
brought before the ECJ by the Polish government, which itself has a less than stellar
fundamental rights record. However, it must not be forgotten that Poland was part of
an informal coalition of six governments spanning the political spectrum who voted
against the DSM Directive in 2019, citing the failure to balance the rights of copyright-
holders with those of citizens and companies.
Alternatives to upload filters
Tuesday’s hearing was structured around four questions. First, the Court asked
whether Article 17 is going to render the use of upload filters mandatory. This question
is relevant for the fundamental rights assessment because the Court has found in
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the past  that general obligations on platforms to monitor all user uploads for illegal
activities violate the fundamental rights of platform operators and their users.
While some commentators have argued that mandatory upload filters which prevent
the use of specific copyright-protected works do not constitute a general monitoring
obligation, this interpretation of the ban on general monitoring is inconsistent with the
CJEU’s case law. It is based on the false assumption that when the ECJ rejected
injunctions requiring the installation of automated filtering systems in Scarlet and
Netlog, it did so because those injunctions would have required providers to look for
infringements of unknown works, without receiving specific information that would help
them identify those works. This is not the case. The judgement in the main proceedings
of Scarlet shows that the dispute concerned the installation of the filtering system
Audible Magic, which only works on the basis of fingerprints submitted by copyright-
holders. This is precisely the kind of technology that platforms are expected to use
when implementing Article 17. In McFadden, the Court even ruled that an obligation
to automatically detect a single, clearly identified song would constitute a prohibited
general monitoring obligation.
In order to meet the requirements of the Court formulated in Glawischnig-Piesczek, a
monitoring obligation must at a minimum be specific to an act that has been deemed
illegal by a court. Copyright filters based on rightsholder information about protected
works, rather than specific infringing uses of those works, are incapable of meeting
those requirements and preventing the collateral blocking of legal uses.
In the hearing, the supporters of Article 17 (the European institutions , backed by
France and Spain) argued that upload filters are not mandatory. They pointed to
the fact that Article 17 does not mention particular technological solutions by which
platforms can demonstrate that they have made best efforts to block copyright
infringements, and that different technologies are available, which are likely to change
over time and could be combined with human review.
Poland argued that while Article 17 does not explicitly prescribe the use of upload
filters, no alternatives are available to platforms to fulfil their obligations under Article
17(4). In a similar vein, Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe asked Parliament and
Council whether a person who is required to travel from Luxembourg to Brussels within
two hours can really be considered to have a choice between driving and walking.
Poland also correctly pointed out that the alternatives presented by the European
institutions, such as fingerprinting, hashing, watermarking, Artificial Intelligence or
keyword search, all constitute alternative methods of filtering, but not alternatives to
filtering.
Balancing freedom of expression and intellectual
property
The second and third questions concerned the risk of upload filters for the freedom
of expression, and whether those risks can be mitigated by interpreting Article 17 as
requiring only the blocking of manifestly infringing content. These questions exposed
the deep divisions between the supporters of Article 17. The European Commission,
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supported by Parliament and Council, defended its interpretation of Article 17, which
it has recently presented to Member States in the form of a draft implementation
guidance: While the obligation to block copyright infringements in Article 17(4) is
merely an obligation to make best efforts, the obligation stemming from Article 17(7)
to keep legal content online is an obligation of result. Therefore, the rights of users to
upload legal content must prevail. Platforms should only be required to block access
to manifestly infringing content. Uploads that could constitute a legal quotation, for
example, must stay online until human review has been concluded.
France and Spain presented the opposite interpretation of Article 17. According to
them, a national implementation in line with the Commission’s draft guidance would
violate Article 17. The right to intellectual property should be prioritized over freedom
of expression in cases of uncertainty over the legality of user uploads, because the
economic damage to copyright-holders from leaving infringements online even for a
short period of time would outweigh the damage to freedom of expression of users
whose legal uploads may get blocked.
Poland raised that regardless of the legal interpretation of Article 17, platforms
do not have the technical means to distinguish between legal and illegal uses of
protected content, leading to overblocking in practice. The existence of a complaint and
redress mechanism alone would not be sufficient to mitigate the damage to freedom
of expression, because online communication relies on speed. Whereas copyright-
holders could be compensated for the time in which an infringing work was available
online, no equivalent compensation could be envisioned for restrictions on freedom of
expression.
The balancing of different competing fundamental rights is likely going to be central
to the Court’s judgement. Aside from the intellectual property of rightsholders and
the freedom of expression and information of users, other fundamental rights need to
be taken into account, most notably the freedom to conduct a business of platform
operators. Article 17 leaves few guarantees for the freedom to conduct a business, by
introducing extremely broad obligations on platform operators, while only limiting those
obligations through a general reference to the principle of proportionality.
When analyzing the relevant case law on freedom of expression , including that of
the European Court of Human Rights (most notably Y#ld#r#m v Turkey, Kharitonov
v Russia and Kablis v Russia), which the ECJ has to take into account, it becomes
clear that the ECtHR has consistently rejected ex-ante restrictions on the freedom of
expression that risk the blocking of lawful content as a form of prior restraint, because
information is blocked that has not been deemed unlawful by a court. This finding holds
true even for cases of hate speech, where the impact of leaving unlawful material
online on the fundamental rights of victims is at least as severe as the impact on
the intellectual property of copyright-holders. The ex-ante restrictions on freedom of
expression established by Article 17 can only be justified in exceptional circumstances
and require precise and specific safeguards against overblocking .
Article 17 fails to meet those strict requirements, because the only specific safeguards
against overblocking apply after legal content has already been blocked. While the
European legislator has expressed the goal that legal content should not be affected
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by Article 17, it does not instruct Member States on how to achieve this goal. Although
the case law of the ECJ on freedom of expression to date is far less detailed than that
of the ECtHR, the hearing gave an indication that the ECJ is paying particular attention
to the issue of safeguards in this case.
EU responsibility for fundamental rights safeguards
In its final question, the Court asked whether the EU legislator has met its obligation
to establish the necessary minimum safeguards against the violation of fundamental
rights in Article 17. In its recent Schrems II ruling, the Court reiterated that “the legal
basis which permits the interference with [fundamental] rights must itself define the
scope of the limitation on the exercise of the right concerned”.
While the proponents of Article 17 considered that the safeguards included in it are
sufficient, such as the complaint and redress mechanism and the obligation to leave
legitimate uses unaffected, Poland argued that the EU legislator had deliberately
passed on these difficult questions to the national legislators and ultimately the
platforms, in an effort to sidestep politically sensitive issues. This is supported
by the fact that the fundamental rights safeguards included in Article 17 lack
enforcement mechanisms, and that those Member States States who have presented
implementation proposals so far – with the exception of Germany – appear intent on
ignoring those safeguards altogether. Judging by the standard developed by the Court
in Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems II, the European legislator has failed to meet its
central responsibility for the safeguarding of fundamental rights.
The judgement will likely come too late
While the fate of Article 17 is far from certain, the clock is ticking for Member States,
who are obliged to implement the DSM Directive by next June. Advocate General
Saugmandsgaard Øe announced at the hearing that he will publish his opinion on
the Polish case on 22 April 2021. The implementation deadline is therefore almost
guaranteed to pass before the Court could deliver its judgement. Member States now
face the dilemma of implementing a provision that could be invalidated by the Court
on fundamental rights grounds shortly after, or to violate their obligation to implement
the DSM Directive on time.
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